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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GUARDIAN STATE BANK, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
F.C. STANGL III, an 
individual, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages. Appellant Guardian State 
Bank (herein, "Bank") sought recovery on a promissory note and 
also sought damages for fraud. Respondent F.C. Stangl III 
(herein, "Stangl") admitted liability on his note with Bank, 
denied the fraud claim and counterclaimed against Bank on 
Bank's indorsement of a separate, but related, promissory note 
which he held. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The cased was tried before the Honorable Scott Daniels 
sitting with a jury. Stangl admitted liability on his note 
with Bank. The facts were undisputed respecting the fact of 
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Bank's unrestricted indorsement of the note held by Stangl. 
Bank adduced its evidence respecting the fraud claim and its 
defenses to the counterclaim. At the close of the evidence the 
trial court granted Stangl1s motion for a directed verdict and 
judgment was entered on June 19f 1984. Notice of appeal was 
filed August 17, 1984. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Stangl seeks a dismissal of this appeal or, in the alterna-
tive, affirmance of the judgment entered below and an award of 
his attorney's fees both in the court below and on this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts advanced by Bank requires amplifica-
tion and clarification. 
A. The Original Transaction. 
In August of 1979, Stangl signed a Guaranty in favor of 
Bank, guaranteeing a $150,000 loan made by Bank to John 
Sargetis Fine Cars, Inc. dba John Sargetis Ford, Inc. [Ex. 2] 
The loan was evidenced by a promissory note of even date 
(herein "Sargetis Note") signed by the corporation. [Ex. 1] 
The Sargetis Note did not mention or refer to the Guaranty. 
[Id.] 
While, on its face, the Sargetis Note was a demand note, 
the Bank had not treated it as such, causing Stangl to believe 
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it was for a longer term, perhaps 5 years. [R. 607, 627; 
514-516; Ex. 7] The payment record on the note and Bank's 
treatment of the note is consistent with Stangl's understanding 
that the Sargetis Note was a term rather than a demand note. 
[Ex. 7] 
Periodic payments were made by the corporation on the 
Sargetis Note. [L3. ] It became delinquent in the spring of 
1980. [Id.] 
B. The Second Transaction. 
Sometime in late April or early May of 1981, Mr. Russell B. 
Webbf Bank's then president, contacted Stangl with respect to 
his guaranty of the Sargetis Note. [R. 561] 
In his meeting with Mr* Webb of the Bank, Stangl never 
unequivocally agreed to pay the Sargetis Note off as implied by 
Bank in its Statement of Facts. [Appellant's Brief, p. 4] 
Stangl testified both on direct and cross-examination that his 
memory of the meeting with Mr. Webb was that while he recog-
nized a certain responsibility in the matter, he needed to 
consult with counsel before he decided what to do about the 
situation. [R. 607-609; 625-628] Mr. Webb's testimony on the 
subject was limited and very general in nature. It is as fol-
lows: 
Q Do you recall the content of your discussion? 
A I do not recall the content exactly. I can only 
assume that the conversation— 
Q Well, let me interrupt. I'm not asking you to 
assume. Ifm asking you to give us your best 
recollection. 
A All right. We discussed the past due loan and 
what direction we should take in satisfying the 
obligation. As I recall, it was indicated that 
Mr. Sargetis had not assets, or if he did, they 
were very limited. That the company no longer 
existed. That Mr. Sargetis was not in a position 
to pay the note. And that Mr. Stangl, as the 
guarantor, would have to accept the responsi-
bility for paying it. 
Conversation again, to the best of my recol-
lection, revolved around how Mr. Stangl would be 
able to take care of this note. As I recall he 
was very cooperative and agreed that he had a 
responsibility. Suggested that he was not in a 
position at that time to pay the obligation in 
full and requested a repayment program which 
called for a specific amount, I think, within 60 
or 90 days, half of it was I recall. And the 
other half within a year. That is to the best of 
my recollection. 
Q Okay. In this conversation who were the parties 
present, to the best of your knowledge? 
A To the best of my knowledge, it was Mr. Stangl 
and myself. 
Q And was this held at what location? 
A At the bank office. 
Q Did you have any further conversations with 
Mr. Stangl? 
A I do not recall any specific conversations with 
him after the initial meeting. However, there 
probably was another meeting at which time the 
transaction was consummated. 
[R. 561-562] 
Upon consultation with his counsel, Stangl was advised that 
he had substantial defenses to the guaranty and could elect to 
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litigate the issue if he desired. [R. 678] Stangl decided 
instead to negotiate with Bank to see if the matter could be 
settled amicably. [Id.] 
After Stangl had consulted with his counsel, Bruce A. Maak, 
the mechanics of the transaction and all further substantive 
conversations and dealings were between lawyers Maak and 
Dearinger (who represented Bank). [R. 567-568; 589; 609; 629] 
The documents reflecting the legal structure of this trans-
action were initially prepared by either Bank or its counsel. 
[R. 678-679] The essence of the structure was that Stangl 
would purchase the Sargetis Note and his Guaranty by giving 
Bank a new personal note (herein, "Stangl Note") for the bal-
ance due on the Sargetis Note, bring the past due interest cur-
rent and forego any suit or claim against his Guaranty. [R. 
662-676; Ex's 1, 2, 4, 10 and 21] Mr. Maak suggested some 
revisions and clarifications to the Bank's draft documents, but 
in his legal judgment those requested changes did not alter the 
overall legal effect of the transaction. [Id.] Stangl never 
made the decision to seek recourse against Bank on the Sargetis 
Note until Bank forced the issue in August of 1982. [R. 616] 
At no time did either Stangl or his counsel establish as a con-
dition to the transaction that Bank had to indorse the Sargetis 
Note with recourse. That is simply the way it worked out. The 
concept of indorser's liability was never discussed--either 
between Stangl and Webb or Maak and Dearinger. The subject 
simply did not arise. [R. 510; 642-643; 685-686; 695] 
Prior to and after Stangl1s purchase of the Sargetis Note 
from Bank, Stangl looked to NACM as a major source for recover-
ing funds to pay Bank. [R. 614] Both Stangl and his attorney 
Bruce A. Maak believed substantial funds could be obtained from 
NACM. It was not until the fall of 1981 that it was discovered 
Ford Motor Credit Co. had a blanket security interest in the 
Sargetis assets assigned to NACM. [R. 680-685] A prior search 
by Mr. Maak at the Secretary of State's office had disclosed no 
secured parties. [R. 682-683; Ex. 8] Consequently, it 
appeared that a substantial sum could be recovered from NACM. 
After purchase of the Sargetis Note by Stangl, his attorney 
attempted to collect on the Sargetis assets which NACM held, 
but to no avail. [Id.] Ford Motor Credit Co. and the IRS got 
all the money. 
C. The Suit Below. 
In late July or early August of 1982, Bank contacted Stangl 
respecting payment of the Stangl Note. Shortly thereafter, 
Stangl effected presentment and demand upon Bank of the 
Sargetis Note which Bank dishonored. [R. 342] Bank then 
elected to sue Stangl on his note and seek a further judgment 
for damages arising from Stangl1s alleged fraud in obtaining 
Bank's indorsement of the Sargetis Note. [R. 2-6; 338-352] 
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Stangl admitted liability on his note and counterclaimed on 
Bankfs indorsement of the Sargetis Note. [R. 10-16] Bank then 
sued its lawyers on a third party claim for negligence. [R. 
101-105] At trial, Bank obtained judgment against Stangl on 
his note. [R. 439-442] Stangl was granted a directed verdict 
against Bank on the fraud claim, was awarded judgment on his 
counterclaim and was allowed to set-off Bank's judgment against 
him. [.Id.] Bank also obtained a judgment against its lawyers 
for the full amount of Stangl1 s judgment. [R. 909] Because 
the jury found Bank 45% negligent, its ultimate recovery 
against its lawyers was reduced by that percentage. The 
lawyers satisfied that judgment and it has not been appealed. 
D. This Appeal. 
Judgment was entered by the court below on June 19, 1984. 
Rule 50(b) and 59 post-trial motions were filed by Bank on 
June 29, 1984. Said motions were never ruled upon. They were 
voluntarily withdrawn on August 15, 1984. [R. 463] On 
August 16, 1984, Bank filed a motion pursuant to URCP 73 to 
extend the time for appeal. [R. 471] Said motion was heard on 
August 17, 1984 and was granted. [R. 473] The order on said 
motion was not entered until September 4, 1984. [R. 496] The 
Notice of Appeal was filed on August 17, 1984. [R. 474] No 
affidavit was filed or other record made in support of the 
motion to extend the appeal time. The sole basis for the lower 
court's finding of excusable neglect justifying extension of 
the appeal time was a recital in the order that "there was 
excusable neglect in that the withdrawal of said post-judgment 
motion was a mistake and plaintiff simply should have requested 
a denial of its motion." [R. 497] 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED. 
Unless the order of the lower court extending the time for 
filing the appeal herein is proper and is further given nunc 
pro tunc effect, this appeal is untimely. 
But for the filing of Rule 50(b) and 59 motions, the Notice 
of Appeal here should have been filed by July 18, 1984. The 
post-trial motions terminate the running of the time for appeal 
until entry in the Register of Actions of an order "granting or 
denying11 such motions. Rule 73(a), URCP. No such order was 
ever entered in this case. The motions were voluntarily with-
drawn by counsel. [R. 463] Upon withdrawal of said motions 
the appeal time expired. The motion to extend time for filing 
the appeal was not filed until the day following the withdrawal 
and the order granting the extension motion was not entered 
until 20 days after the withdrawal on September 4, 1984. 
[R. 496] Thus, when the Notice of Appeal was filed on 
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August 17, 1984, it was out of time and no order extending the 
filing time had been entered. 
Even if we are to assume that the September 4, 1984 order 
extending the appeal time is to be given retroactive effect, a 
problem remains because the motion to extend was improperly 
granted. Per Rule 73(a), URCP the appeal time can be extended 
only "upon a showing of excusable neglect." When the excusable 
neglect standard is applied in a jurisdictional context, as 
here, the standard is necessarily a strict one. Prowswood, 
Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 
1984). This court has stated that: 
Inadvertence or mistake of counsel does not constitute 
the type of unique or extraordinary circumstances con-
templated by this strict standard. 
* * * 
a flat mistake of counsel about the meaning of a stat-
ute or rule may not justify relief: relief is not 
extended Mto cover any kind of garden variety over-
sight." Id. at 960. 
Here, there is no record whatever to establish a showing of 
excusable neglect, save and except the recitation in the lower 
*It is the Order, not the minute entry which is the con-
trolling document and which truly embodies the ruling of the 
court. Cook v. Gardner, 381 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1963). Further, 
an order cannot be given nunc pro tunc effect where it is being 
used to "revive time for taking a required step in a legal 
proceeding after the statutory time for doing it has elapsed." 
Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 399 P.2d 141, 
144 (Utah 1965). 
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court's order that "withdrawal of the « . . motion was a mis-
take and plaintiff simply should have requested a denial of its 
motion." [R. 497] 
Thus, we have a simple mistake of counsel in reading the 
Rules of Civil Procedure as the sole justification for excus-
able neglect to support extension of the appeal time. This 
court has found such a mistake to be insufficient. Id. The 
lower court thus abused its discretion in extending the appeal 
time; consequently, this appeal is untimely and should be 
forthwith dismissed. 
POINT II 
BANK MAY NOT RAISE AND ADVANCE ARGUMENTS 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial 
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983). All of the arguments raised by Bank under Point I 
of its brief on appeal (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-17) are 
advanced for the first time on appeal. They were not framed, 
briefed or argued at the trial level. Thus they may not prop-
erly be considered here. Id. 
However, even if such arguments were properly raised and 
advanced, they are without merit. 
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A. Bank Has No Rights Under The Guaranty. 
Bank claims that under principles of equitable subrogation 
it is entitled to recover from Stangl once it reacquires and 
pays the Sargetis Note because Stangl guaranteed that note. 
First and foremost, the guaranty instrument is a separate 
and distinct instrument from the Sargetis Note. [Cf. 
Exhibits 1 and 2] The note makes no mention of the guaranty 
and is a fully enforceable and negotiable instrument separate 
and distinct from the guaranty. [Ex. 1] Stangl acquired the 
guaranty, is the owner of it and Bank has no rights whatever 
under it. Concurrently with Bank's becoming liable on the 
Sargetis Note by indorsement, it assigned away to Stangl any 
and all rights it may have had under the guaranty. [Ex. 2] 
In addition to the argument that Bank cannot enforce a 
guaranty it does not own or hold, three additional arguments 
bar Bank's subrogation claim. First, subrogation is an equita-
ble remedy. Simson v. Bilderbeck, Inc., 417 P.2d 803 (N.M. 
1966). Bank elected here to bring an action at law for damages 
and, as noted above, did not plead a subrogation claim below. 
Secondly, Bank fails to draw the distinction between the 
situation where a co-maker discharges an obligation and seeks 
recovery against the other maker, and the case at bar where an 
indorser seeks recovery from an accomraodation guarantor who has 
since reacquired his guaranty. None of the cases cited by Bank 
at pages 10 and 11 of its brief deal with a fact situation 
similar to the instant case. For example: N.J. Gendron Lumber 
v. Great Northern Homesy Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 39 5 N.E.2d 
457 (1979) [plaintiff owned the guaranty and was originally the 
guaranteed party]; Halpin v. Fankenberger, 644 P.2d 452 (Kan. 
1982) [action by co-guarantor against co-guarantor and cred-
itor; no indorsement involved; action against creditor failed]; 
Simson v. Bilderbeck, Inc., supra [suit by accommodation maker 
against maker; no guaranty or indorsement involved]; Moyer v. 
CoIyer, 283 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1955) [a lien priority action 
between a guarantor who had satisfied a debt and taken posses-
sion of collateral and a third party judgment creditor seeking 
attachment of the collateral]. 
Finally, the promissory note has merged into the judgment 
entered in this action and no longer exists as an instrument 
upon which a subrogation claim may be based. Yergensen v. 
Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 1965). If Bank had wanted to 
pursue this avenue it would have had to voluntarily pay the 
Sargetis Note, reacquire the same prior to judgment being 
entered upon it and then pursue its theory. This it did not 
do. The rule of merger is a laudable one because without it 
litigation would never end. Here, the Sargetis Note was 
reduced to judgment, merged into the judgment and lost its 
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character as a promissory note. Bank may not revive it and 
pursue further claims based thereon. 
B. Bank Has Not Been Discharged. 
Bank also argues that Stangl's acquisition of the Sargetis 
Note operated to discharge it by virtue of the operation of UCA 
§ 70A-3-208 (1953). This argument, raised for the first time 
on appeal, must fail. Where the guaranty in question is a 
separate contract and is not negotiated with the note, by its 
own terms the statute is inapplicable. In order for the dis-
charge provisions of § 3-208 to apply, the transaction must 
involve an "instrument" as defined by § 3-102 and the reacquir-
ing party must have been a "party" to such instrument. The 
instrument in question here is the Sargetis Note. Stangl was 
not a party to that note--the parties were Empire State Bank 
and John Sargetis Fine Cars, Inc. dba John Sargetis Ford, Inc. 
Bank has cited two cases for the supposed proposition that a 
"party" to the instrument (note) includes those executing sep-
arate guarantys for purposes of § 3-208. The cases cited are: 
Commerce Bank of St. Louis v. Wright, 645 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 
1982) and Provident Bank v. Gast, 57 Ohio St. 2d 102, 386 
N.E.2d 1357 (1979). Those cases do not stand for the proposi-
tion cited. They do not even deal with the code section in 
question. Rather, they are cases involving the definition of 
"party" under S 3-606(1)(b) of the UCC which deals with the 
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question of whether a guarantor, co-maker or surety is dis-
charged from their obligations when the holder releases or 
otherwise impairs collateral securing a note. They are funda-
mentally inapplicable here* A simple reading of § 3-208 leads 
one inexorably to conclude that it does not apply because 
2 
Stangl was not a party to the Sargetis Note. It is unneces-
sary to address cases dealing with other statutes that say 
black is white. The fact is: Stangl was not a party to the 
Sargetis Note, he did not sign it and thus the cited statute 
does not apply. 
C. Bank Is Not An "Accommodation Indorser." 
The final commercial argument raised for the first time on 
appeal by Bank is that Bank was an accommodation indorser and 
therefore cannot be held liable to the accommodated party, 
citing UCA § 70A-3-415(5). The simple answer to this argument 
is that Bank was not an accommodation indorser. Bank owned the 
note. It was selling the note to Stangl in exchange for a new 
note with him as maker. Generally, if you are in the chain of 
title, the presumption is that you are not an accommodation 
party. Likewise, if you are not in the chain of title, the 
2Under the UCC, in order to be liable to the holder of an 
instrument your signature must appear on it. UCA § 70A-3-401 
(1953) . 
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presumption arises that you are an accommodation party. See, 
UCA § 70A-3-415(4) (1953). Here, Bank is in the chain of 
title. It received consideration for the indorsement (a new 
note), and it has advanced no evidence or theory to show it was 
3 
an accommodation mdorser. Its argument must fail. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A 
DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF STANGL. 
To place the ruling of the trial court in proper perspec-
tive, it is critical to analyze just what the Bank was trying 
to accomplish with this lawsuit and how it was trying to do 
it. Bank's complaint sought collection on the Stangl Note and 
set forth a fraud claim for damages. Stangl admitted liability 
on his note and counterclaimed on Bank's indorsement of the 
Sargetis Note. Bank raised defenses of mistake, lack of con-
sideration and lack of good faith. No affirmative equitable 
relief was ever sought. This action was brought as a case at 
law for damages. Bank sought to keep the benefit of its bar-
gain (the new Stangl Note) and yet to avoid any liability on 
the Sargetis Note it indorsed which was used to purchase the 
3The burden of pleading and proof is upon the party claiming 
accommodation status. Hanson v. Cheek, 10 UCC Rep. 670, 475 
S.W.2d 526 (Ark. 1972). 
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Stangl Note. Bank never offered to unwind this transaction and 
start over. Rather, it sought to selectively enforce those 
portions of the transaction it liked and to selectively avoid 
those aspects of the transaction which it disliked. It has 
elected to affirm the contracts.which the alleged fraud con-
cerned (the Sargetis and Stangl Notes) and pursue its fraud 
claim for damages. See, Estate Counseling Service v. Merrill, 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 303 F.2d 527, 531 (10th Cir. 
1962); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (1980). Hindsight 
has proven Bankfs election to have been unwise. No fraud was 
proven. However, this does not give Bank the right to claim 
error, appeal the decision of the court below and bring its 
claim anew on a different theory. 
A. The Claim Of Fraud. 
The claim by Bank as to just what constituted the alleged 
fraud has never been very clear. Early in the case the empha-
sis seemed to be that perhaps it was lawyer Maak who had 
deceived lawyer Dearinger. However, as evidence was adduced it 
became apparent that this was not so as the first draft of 
documents from Bank and its counsel had the same legal effect 
as those generated after Mr. Maak's involvement. Mr. Maak had 
no input whatever in the first draft and had not actively 
negotiated the deal with Mr. Webb at the Bank. The legal die 
was cast prior to Mr. Maak's involvement. So, if a fraud 
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occurred which distorted that legal structure it must have been 
between Stangl and Mr. Webb. 
Mr. Webb's complete recollection of his negotiations with 
Stangl are set forth verbatim, supra at 4. Stangl's recollec-
tion concerning the negotiations are found in the record at 
pages 625-628. A reading of this testimony readily indicates 
that no misrepresentations of any kind occurred in these nego-
tiations. Bank has conceded this point as its fraud argument 
treats this as an omission case claiming Stangl failed to dis-
close the whole truth. [Appellant's Brief at 19] An omission 
case will lie only where there exists a duty to speak. Such a 
duty will not be found where the parties deal at arms length 
and where the underlying facts are reasonably within the knowl-
edge of both parties. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). 
Here, indorsement of the note was never discussed. The 
subject never arose. As noted previously, the legal structure 
of the transaction was a matter negotiated between counsel. 
Stangl had given his lawyer full authority to negotiate and 
structure the deal. Stangl was not advised by his counsel that 
he had the legal right to go against Bank until he was driving 
to the Bank with his lawyer to close the deal. [R. 612] He 
did not have a duty to disclose something to Mr. Webb he never 
even became aware of until a week later. Further, Bank first 
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came up with the unrestricted indorsement idea. And it did so 
without any suggestion or prompting by Stangl or his lawyer. 
In effect, Bank is saying that Stangl had an affirmative duty 
to advise Bank of the legal effect of instruments which Bank 
and/or its counsel prepared when both parties were represented 
in the transaction by legal counsel. Such is not the law of 
Utah. Bank was obliged to take reasonable steps to protect its 
own interests. Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 
1967). Stangl did not have an affirmative duty to protect Bank 
from its own negligence--which is what the jury finally found 
as a matter of fact and law was the proximate cause of its 
loss. [R. 903-904] 
When reduced to its essence, Bank's fraud claim is that 
Stangl, having decided he wanted to purchase the Sargetis Note, 
had to disclose in advance to Bank all uses to which the note 
might be put in the future, even though Stangl himself did not 
know. Or, in the alternative, that Stangl had an affirmative 
duty to advise Bank of the legal effect of its own papers even 
though Bank was represented by counsel. 
Bank cites Berkeley Bank for Co-Ops v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1980) for the proposition that Stangl had a duty to tell 
Bank what he intended to do with the Sargetis Note. As stated 
above, at the time he was negotiating with Webb, Stangl did not 
know Bank would have indorser liability—the subject was not 
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discussed and the documents were not prepared. Further, Stangl 
never himself decided to enforce the indorsement until circum-
stances compelled the decision in August of 1982. [R. 616] 
One cannot misrepresent an intent which does not exist. The 
Meibos case is thus inapposite. If no future intention 
respecting a given subject even existsf it is impossible to 
misrepresent that intention. 
Once Stangl did learn of his rights respecting the indorse-
ment by Bank, the negotiations were over and the deal was 
struck. Counsel, with full authority, had reached a compromise 
where each party had altered their respective positions in 
order to settle a dispute. Bank now obliquely suggests that 
Stangl had a duty to then step forward and advise Bank that it 
should perhaps try to improve its bargain. As noted pre-
viously, no such duty exists. Further, given the sequence of 
events the alleged fraud would not have occurred contempor-
aneously with the preparation and execution of the instruments 
and would not have been made to one "unable to judge of its 
true construction." Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 
1984). Thus, no claim of fraud will lie. 
Finally, and critical to the duty question here is that 
this transaction was between sophisticated businessmen who were 
represented by counsel at all critical stages of the deal. 
Bank and its counsel were the experts in commercial paper 
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they dealt in it daily. It was an arms length transaction 
between parties to a dispute where the posture was adver-
sarial. For this court to require lawyers on opposite sides of 
a question to disclose their legal theories and intentions to 
the other side would in effect require them to represent both 
sides to a dispute at the same time. In fact, an ethical duty 
exists which prohibits such conduct. The lower court properly 
ruled that no fraud had been shown. 
B. Bank Is Collaterally Estopped To Claim Fraud. 
As noted above, the jury found that the proximate cause of 
Bank's loss was the negligence of Bank and its lawyers Kirton & 
McConkie. That verdict was not appealed and the judgment on 
the verdict has been satisfied. By continuing to assert its 
fraud claim Bank now argues in effect that the cause of its 
loss was the fraud of Stangl. It cannot be both. The damages 
claimed for the fraud are identical to those claimed for the 
negligent acts of Kirton and McConkie. [R. 910-914] Where 
Bank has chosen to accept the benefits of the judgment against 
its lawyers rather than appeal, it has lost its right to assert 
Stangl's alleged fraud as the cause of its loss. The issue of 
ultimate fact (i.e. the cause of Bank's loss) has been fully 
and finally adjudicated. Bank has benefitted from such deter-
mination and is now collaterally estopped from repudiating the 
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finding in order to re-litigate the identical issue against 
Stangl. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). 
C. Intent To Pay The Stangl Note. 
Stangl has never questioned his obligation to pay the 
Stangl Note. Liability was admitted in the answer [R. 11, 1| 8] 
and again in the Pre-Trial Order. [R. 341f % 5] Bank's claim 
that Stangl misled Bank on his intention to pay the Stangl Note 
is simply not supported by the record. In point of fact, Bank 
obtained a judgment on the note. [R. 440] Stangl has paid 
that judgment by setting off $192,019.32 of the amount owed to 
him by Bank. [I<3. ] Bank's argument that Stangl never intended 
to pay his note finds no support in this case. 
D. The Conditional Delivery Argument. 
Bank suggests that the Sargetis Note was delivered to 
Stangl for a limited or conditional purpose and therefore Bank 
is not liable on its indorsement. 
The argument is new, having been raised for the first time 
on appeal. Also, it finds no evidentiary support in the record 
whatever. Even under Bank's cases, it would be incumbent upon 
Bank to plead and prove a collateral agreement in order to 
rebut the express terms of the indorsement itself. UCA 
§ 70A-3-414 (1953). Bank has not done this. The evidence does 
not even suggest or hint that such an agreement was reached or 
even discussed. This argument must fail. 
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E. Reformation and Rescission. 
Bank would apparently like to change its entire theory of 
this case on appeal and seek equity. It is too late. The 
remedy of damages has been elected. Bank elected to sue on the 
Stangl note and obtained a judgment in its favor. It further 
elected to sue its lawyers for negligence, and it collected 
from them. It cannot now keep the fruits of that election and 
seek only to rescind or reform that portion of the transaction 
which, with benefit of hindsight, appears detrimental. See, 
Dugan v. Jones, supra. 
Further, mistake of fact was raised only as a defense to 
the counterclaim. Thus, it may be used only as a matter of 
avoidance to the claim - not as a vehicle for affirmative 
equitable relief. 
Bank suggests its joinder of a claim for declaratory relief 
gives the court the latitude to grant equitable remedies. This 
is not true. A declaratory action will not lie where the pur-
pose is to determine the sufficiency of legal defenses to a 
pending action. Royal Indemnity Co. v. McFadden, 65 Ohio App. 
15, 29 N.E.2d 181 (1940). A declaratory action is not to be 
used as a substitute for actions at lav/ or in equity where a 
remedy is available. Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 
58, 235 N.W. 829 (1931); Anno., Declaratory Judgments, 87 ALR 
1205, 1221; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments, § 16. It was 
-22-
thus proper for the lower court to dismiss the declaratory 
count as it was redundant and improper under the circum-
stances. The defenses to the counterclaim were addressed on 
their merits and the lower court obviously found them insuf-
ficient as a matter of law. 
F. Lack Of Consideration. 
Bank's claim on this point continues to ignore the evidence 
in this case. Stangl gave a new note with him as maker to pur-
chase the Sargetis Note. [Ex. 10] He also paid $8,104.39 to 
bring the interest current on the Sargetis Note. [Ex. 21] He 
gave up defenses his lawyer thought he had to the guaranty. 
[R. 678] Any one of these items constitutes sufficient con-
sideration to support the indorsement. Pern Inv. Co. v. Carbon 
Co. Land Co., 75 P.2d 660, 664 (Utah 1938); Restatement, 
Second, Contracts § 74 (1981). Also, if there is no con-
sideration for the Sargetis indorsement then likewise there is 
none for the Stangl Note and this whole case is moot. In point 
of fact, adequate consideration as described above existed to 
support the entire transaction. 
G. Good Faith. 
Bank suggests that state of mind - the absence or existence 
of good faith - is an element to a negotiable instrument case. 
The authority Bank cites for the proposition does not support 
-23-
it. The idea is counter to the basic notions of commercial 
transactions. 
Commercial intercourse as we know it would screech to a 
halt if a party's state of mind (lack of good faith if you 
will) became a defense to a promissory note. Commercial paper 
would be rendered meaningless. Every action to enforce a note 
would involve a foray into "the intention of the parties" at 
the time the paper was created. The parole evidence rule would 
be circumvented, the statute of frauds avoided. 
State of mind in a contract case is irrelevant. The 
absence of good faith is not a defense to a promissory note. 
And then, of course, there is no evidence here that Stangl was 
dishonest or did not act in good faith when the deal was made. 
POINT IV 
STANGL IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
At the trial level, Stangl was denied recovery of his 
attorney's fees. [R. 445] Said denial was based solely on 
grounds of "equity." [Id.] 
The claim for fees by Stangl was legally based upon the 
provisions of the Sargetis Note which provided for the recovery 
of such fees. [Ex. 1] 
The position of Stangl was and is that where the contract 
(i.e. the Sargetis Note) provides for the recovery of such 
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fees, the discretion of the trial court is bounded only by the 
reasonableness and the amount of such fees - and that discre-
tion does not extend to the issue of whether the trial court 
can choose not to award fees in the first instance. 
In Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 392 (Utah 1984), this 
court held that where the parties have agreed by contract to 
the allowance of attorney's fees and where the evidence as to 
such fees is essentially undisputed, the trial court should 
award the fees. This court noted that where the parties have 
entered an arms-length transaction regarding such fees, the 
court should not ignore it. [^1(3.] This is the general rule. 
On occasion, this court has made exception - however, none of 
them apply here. For example, see: Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 
606 (Utah 1976) [Plaintiff lost primary issue in the case and 
received substantial forfeiture in addition]; Fireman's 
Insurance Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974) [Both parties 
had breached contract and the court essentially effected a 
set-off]; American Gypsum Trust v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 
542 P.2d 658 (Utah 1973) [Trial court found against plaintiff 
on major issue in the case]. 
In the instant case, none of these exceptions exist. 
Stangl prevailed below and is entitled to prevail on appeal. 
Bank did not win a major contested issue. The contract is 
clear. The evidence respecting the reasonableness of the fees 
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is not seriously disputed. [R. 319-320; 325-337; 435-438] 
Stangl should be awarded his attorneyfs fees for the case below 
and on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This transaction began as a disputed matter between two 
parties represented by counsel. The matter was negotiated at 
arms length. Thereafter, the factual circumstances changed. 
The expectation that Stangl would be able to recover a substan-
tial amount from NACM was not fulfilled. Bank became disen-
chanted when the legal effect of the settlement and compromise 
was pursued to effect by Stangl. It claimed fraud and sought 
to retain its benefit from the compromise and disavow its 
detriment. 
The lower court found no evidence of fraud. The record 
discloses none. No evidence supports Bank's defenses. Many 
defenses were not raised below. Those which were raised were 
not proved. By accepting the benefits of its third party judg-
ment. Bank is collaterally estopped from repudiating the jury's 
finding and re-litigating the causation issue which supported 
its $108,000 recovery from the third party defendant. 
Finally, Stangl should be entitled to recover his attor-
ney's fees against Bank because: the contract provided for 
recovery; Bank failed to prevail on any significant contested 
issue; the amount was essentially undisputed and the trial 
court should not have rewritten the agreement between the 
parties on this point.
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